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Thus, as of today, the United States will cease all implemen-
tation of the non-binding Paris Accord and the draconian finan-
cial and economic burdens the agreement imposes on our coun-
try. This includes ending the implementation of the nationally 
determined contribution and, very importantly, the Green Cli-
mate Fund which is costing the United States a vast fortune.1 
 
*  In memoriam, former Distinguished Lecturer and Legal-Scholar-in-
Residence, Colorado College. 
1.  Press Release, President Donald J. Trump on the Paris Accord (June 1, 
2017), https://perma.cc/XW9A-P7KY. President Trump confirmed this deci-
sion at the G20 meeting in Hamburg, Germany. G20 Summit, G20 Lead-
er’s Declaration, Shaping an Interconnected World, at 10 (July 7/8, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/C8AY-ZK5Q (“We take note of the decision of the United 
States of America to withdraw from the Paris Agreement. The United 
States of America announced it will immediately cease the implementation 
1
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I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
With the words quoted above, President Trump set a course 
to end the United States’ status as a party to the Paris Agree-
ment2 and renounced all activities implementing it. A wide 
range of political and business leaders criticized the President’s 
decision;3 however, supporters of the coal industry applauded 
it.4 
In his announcement, President Trump also stated that he 
would comply with the withdrawal provision in the Paris 
Agreement.5 This Essay argues that, while compliance with that 
process may satisfy the treaty obligation, it probably does not 
conform to U.S. constitutional standards, and therefore, would 
not be binding on the United States. 
The argument demonstrating the failure of the President to 
satisfy constitutional standards proceeds as follows. Part I de-
velops the context in which the Paris Agreement arose. Part II 
briefly summarizes the Paris Agreement. In Part III, I argue 
that President Trump’s attempt to cease implementation of the 
Paris Agreement and, in effect, withdraw from the treaty, does 
not meet U.S. standards required by the Constitution, specifical-
ly Article II, § 2, Clause 2.6 Finally, in Part IV, I consider the 
question posed in the title of this Essay and conclude that the 
answer is probably “no.” In addition, I discuss the destabiliza-
tion to global governance that would result if the answer were 
“yes.” 
 
of its current nationally-determined contribution and affirms its strong 
commitment to an approach that lowers emissions while supporting eco-
nomic growth and improving energy security needs. The United States of 
America states it will endeavour to work closely with other countries to 
help them access and use fossil fuels more cleanly and efficiently and help 
deploy renewable and other clean energy sources, given the importance of 
energy access and security in their nationally-determined contributions.”).   
2. See generally Framework Convention on Climate Change, Adoption of 
the Paris Agreement, Dec. 12, 2015, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1 
[hereinafter Paris Agreement], https://perma.cc/R72J-FR62. 
3.  See Michael D. Shear, Trump Will Withdraw U.S. From Paris Climate 
Agreement, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2017), https://perma.cc/A65P-W2JD.  
4.  See id.  
5.  Id. 
6.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.  (“[The President] shall have Power, by and 
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two 
thirds of the Senators present concur . . . .”).   
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol35/iss2/3
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II. A GENEALOGY AND SUMMARY OF THE PARIS 
AGREEMENT 
The Paris Agreement was negotiated under the United Na-
tions Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”).7 
The UNFCCC was opened for signature on June 4, 1992 at the 
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 
(“UNCED” or “Rio Earth Summit”) and entered into force on 
March 24, 1994.8 There are currently 197 parties;9 the United 
States is one of them.10 
Administrative structure is included in the Convention. Ar-
ticle 7 establishes a Conference of the Parties (“COP”) and speci-
fies its duties and authority.11 Article 8 creates a Secretariat as 
the executive office,12 and Article 9 calls for a scientific and 
technical committee.13 
As its name indicates, the UNFCCC is a framework conven-
tion; it is widely acknowledged that it contains procedural re-
quirements but not substantive limits on greenhouse gas emis-
sions.14 As the discussion below demonstrates, despite the 
absence of limits on greenhouse gas emissions, there are provi-
sions in the Convention that are consequential because they lim-
it the sovereignty of the parties.15 
 
7.  United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 
1771 U.N.T.S 107, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 102-38 (1992) [hereinafter 
UNFCCC]. 
8.  Status of Ratification of the Convention, U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON 
CLIMATE CHANGE ,  https://perma.cc/BU5Y-HXH2 (“The Convention entered 
into force on 21 March 1994, in accordance with Article 23, that is on the 
ninetieth day after the date of deposit of the fiftieth instrument of ratifica-
tion, acceptance, approval or accession.”). 
9.  Id. 
10.  Id. 
11.  UNFCCC, supra note 7, at art. 7 (“A Conference of the Parties is hereby 
established.”). 
12.  Id. at art. 8. 
13.  Id. at art. 9. 
14.  See id. at art. 4 (“[Developed States agree to report information] with the 
aim of returning individually or jointly to their 1990 levels [of emissions of 
greenhouse gases subject to the Convention]”) (emphasis added); DAVID 
HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 665 (5th 
ed. 2015) (“The [UNFCCC] established a general framework, but delineat-
ed few specific or substantive obligations to curb climate change.”).  
15.  See infra notes 16–24 and accompanying text.  
3
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The important procedural requirements for planning in the 
UNFCCC include preparing inventories of greenhouse gas 
sources and sinks,16 integrating environmental planning with 
economic development,17 and reporting and exchanging relevant 
data and plans to mitigate climate change.18 Developed states 
must prepare plans to mitigate global climate change by limit-
ing greenhouse gas emissions and enhancing sinks,19 provide 
developing states funds to pay for their data collection and dis-
tribution,20 and prepare policies that aim to reduce their green-
house gas emissions to their 1990 levels.21 
Other procedural provisions include the establishment of a 
fund to aid developing states22 and recognition of the option of 
joint implementation.23 Finally, the principle of common but dif-
ferentiated responsibility is included by dividing the parties into 
two groups: Annex I Parties are developed states and non-Annex 
I Parties are developing states.24 
Each of the provisions is a procedural obligation that re-
quires the parties to yield part of their sovereignty. Although 
one only requires developed parties to aim at a reduction to 
1990 levels, under the doctrine “pacta sunt servanda,” it also 
limits sovereignty.25 
 
16.  UNFCCC, supra note 7, at arts. 4.1(a), 12.1(a). 
17.  Id. at art. 4.1(f). 
18.  Id. at art. 4.1(b). 
19.  Id. at art. 4.2(a). 
20. Id. at art. 4.3. 
21.  Id. at art. 4.2(b) (emphasis added). 
22.  Id. at art. 11. 
23.  Id. at art. 4.2(a).   
24.  See id. at annex I, II. 
25.  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 26, May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention] (defining pacta sunt servan-
da as: “[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be 
performed by them in good faith”). Although the United States is not a par-
ty to the Vienna Convention, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, https://perma.cc/CR5P-6NGF, it has acknowledged 
pacta sunt servanda as binding customary international law. See U.N. 
Conference on the Law of Treaties, 1st Sess., 29th mtg. at 151, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.39/C1/SR.29 (Apr. 18, 1968) [hereinafter Conference on the Law 
of Treaties], https://perma.cc/MJ9C-RFU2 (“Mr. Briggs [on behalf of the 
United States] said that the pacta sunt servanda rule had come down 
through the ages as a self-evident truth. Both comparative law and the 
history of legal systems showed that it had gained universal acceptance; it 
had been found to be a legal necessity. The principle had been a basic rule 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol35/iss2/3
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Predecessors of the UNFCCC in the ancestral lineage of the 
Paris Agreement include the Kyoto Protocol,26 the Copenhagen 
Accord,27 the Cancun Agreements,28 and the Durban Platform 
for Enhanced Action.29 
The Kyoto Protocol is a top-down treaty that sets limits on 
greenhouse gas emissions for Annex I Parties.30 It did not 
achieve its objectives primarily because China was classified as 
a non-Annex I Party and because the United States refused to 
become a party. Thus, the number one and number two emitters 
of greenhouse gases were not bound by emission caps.31 The Co-
penhagen Accord switched to a bottom-up approach in which 
each party unilaterally determined its goal for reducing its 
greenhouse gas emissions.32 
 
of international law from its earliest origins, and was the foundation-stone 
of further progress and development.”).  
26.  Making Those First Steps Count: An Introduction to the Kyoto Protocol, 
U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 
https://perma.cc/5WVX-8SD3. 
27.  U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the Conference 
of the Parties on its Fifteenth Session, Held in Copenhagen from 7 to 19 De-
cember 2009, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2009/11Add.1 (Mar. 30, 2010), 
https://perma.cc/PB4F-32A6.  
28.  The Cancun Agreements, U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE, https://perma.cc/NQF5-A2HC.  
29.  U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the Conference 
on the Parties on its Seventeenth Session, Held in Durban from 28 Novem-
ber to 11 December 2011, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1 (Mar. 15, 
2012), https://perma.cc/Q3B2-8VES. The texts of the Kyoto Protocol, the 
Copenhagen Accord, the Cancun Agreements, and the Durban Platform for 
Enhanced Action are available at Background on the UNFCCC: The Inter-
national Response to Climate Change, U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON 
CLIMATE CHANGE, https://perma.cc/7T9Q-BJ8R.  
30.  Making Those First Steps Count: An Introduction to the Kyoto Protocol, su-
pra note 26. 
31.  Phillip M. Kannan, Mitigating Global Climate Change: Designing a Dy-
namic Convention to Combat a Dynamic Risk, 36 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & 
POL’Y  REV. 491, 499–500 (2012). “Inclusion of [Annex I and non-Annex I 
differentiation] meant that the Kyoto Protocol failed to be a means of mar-
shaling collective action.” Id. at 499.   
32.  Daniel Bodansky, The Paris Climate Agreement: A New Hope?, 110 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 288, 292 (2016). (“[T]he Copenhagen Accord, in embryonic form, 
pointed the way forward. In contrast to the Kyoto Protocol, which had set 
emission reduction targets through a collective process of international ne-
gotiations, the Copenhagen Accord established a bottom-up architecture, in 
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The Paris Agreement continued the bottom-up approach.33 
This is achieved by requiring each party to submit its intended 
nationally determined contributions (“INDC”) to reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions.34 Unlike the Copenhagen Accord, the 
Paris Agreement requires the parties to submit a new INDC 
every five years.35 Moreover, it states that “[the] successive na-
tionally determined contribution will represent a progression 
beyond the Party’s then current nationally determined contribu-
tion and reflect its highest possible ambition[.]”36 This strength-
ened the Paris Agreement by building in the possibilities and 
goals of adaptive management and continuous improvement for 
all parties. 
The Paris Agreement is also strengthened by the inclusion 
of procedural standards for developing adaptations,37 providing 
financial resources,38 transferring technology,39 reporting da-
ta,40 and developing a baseline from which to measure pro-
gress.41 These provisions add standards and structure to the 
procedures designed to help achieve the substantive goal or sub-
stantive policy of “[h]olding the increase in the global average 
temperature to well below 2° C above pre-industrial lev-
els . . . .”42 
The concept of substantive goals is part of U.S. environmen-
tal law and international environmental law. In the U.S., it has 
been applied in cases interpreting the National Environmental 
Policy Act (“NEPA”). It was first described and applied by Judge 
Skelly Wright as follows: 
[T]he general substantive policy of the [National Environ-
mental Policy] Act is a flexible one. It leaves room for a responsi-
ble exercise of discretion and may not require particular substan-
 
33.  See id. for a thorough history and analysis of the Paris Agreement.  
34.  Paris Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 4.2 (“Each Party shall prepare, 
communicate and maintain successive nationally determined contributions 
that it intends to achieve.”). 
35.  Id. at art. 4.9. 
36.  Id. at art. 4.3. 
37.  See id. at art. 7. 
38.  Id. at art. 9. 
39.  Id. at art. 10. 
40.  Id. at art. 13. 
41.  Id. at art. 14. 
42.  Id. at art. 2.1(a) (emphasis added). 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol35/iss2/3
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tive results in particular problematic instances. However, the Act 
also contains very important “procedural” provisions—provisions 
which are designed to see that all federal agencies do in fact exer-
cise the substantive discretion given them.43 
The Supreme Court recognized substantive goals and sub-
stantive policies in Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council v. Kar-
len.44 It did so in interpreting NEPA’s substantive goal regarding 
environmental impact statements (“EISs”) for certain federal ac-
tions: “to insure a fully informed and well-considered decision.”45 
The agency has not satisfied this requirement until it “has made 
an adequate compilation of relevant information, has analyzed it 
reasonably, has not ignored pertinent data, and has made disclo-
sures to the public.”46 
The concept of substantive goals is also recognized in cus-
tomary international environmental law. This customary interna-
tional law47 is the doctrine called pacta sunt servanda, which has 
been articulated as: “[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the 
parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.”48 For 
example, this law prohibits a party to the Paris Agreement from 
committing to “prepare, communicate and maintain successive 
nationally determined contributions that it intends to achieve,”49 
and then ignoring this commitment. Each party must prepare 
and submit a nationally determined contribution, which must 
aim at “[h]olding the increase in the global average temperature 
to well below 2° C”50 and then make good-faith efforts to comply 
with it. 
Although neither the substantive goal norm developed in the 
domestic law of the U.S. nor the norm that evolved in interna-
 
43.  Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 
449 F.2d 1109, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (emphasis added). 
44.  444 U.S. 223, 227 (1980) (“NEPA . . . establish[ed] significant substantive 
goals . . . .”) (quoting Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 
519, 558 (1978)). 
45.  Id. (quoting Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp., 435 U.S. at 558). 
46.  See Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 701 F.2d 1011, 1029 (2d Cir. 
1983).  
47.  See Vienna Convention, supra note 25, for a discussion of the legal status 
of pacta sunt servanda as customary international law. 
48.  Id. at art. 26. 
49.  Paris Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 4.2. 
50.  Id. at art. 2.1(a). 
7
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tional law is binding on the other system of governance, each pro-
vides a framework for the other system for analyzing the issues 
regarding substantive norms. They are models that provide guid-
ance for—not precedents binding on—the other system. Using 
this framework and modifying Judge Wright’s articulation of the 
purpose of substantive policies quoted above regarding the obliga-
tions imposed on federal agencies to reflect the international sta-
tus of the Paris Agreement, the norm in international law may be 
articulated as follows: customary international law, namely pacta 
sunt servanda, is “designed to see that all [parties] do in fact ex-
ercise the substantive discretion [retained by] them.”51 
III. PRESIDENT TRUMP’S ATTEMPT TO CEASE ALL 
IMPLEMENTATION AND TO WITHDRAW FROM 
THE PARIS AGREEMENT: INCONSISTENT WITH 
ARTICLE II, § 2, CL. 2 OF THE CONSTITUTION? 
Litigation will be required to test the constitutionality of 
President Trump’s actions regarding the Paris Agreement.52 
Such litigation will require (1) a plaintiff with standing and (2) 
substantive arguments demonstrating the unconstitutionality of 
these actions. 
A. Satisfying the Standing Requirement 
As noted above, President Trump stated53 that the United 
States would comply with the denunciation article in the Paris 
Agreement.54 At the earliest, the withdrawal would take effect 
in November 2019.55 However, President Trump announced on 
 
51.  Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 
449 F.2d 1109, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
52.  See Press Release, supra note 1, for a description of these actions. 
53.  Id.  
54.  Paris Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 28.1 (“At any time after three years 
from the date on which this Agreement has entered into force for a Party, 
that Party may withdraw from this Agreement by giving written notifica-
tion to the Depositary.”); id. at art. 28.2 (“Any such withdrawal shall take 
effect upon expiry of one year from the date of receipt by the Depositary of 
the notification of withdrawal, or on such later date as may be specified in 
the notification of withdrawal.”).  
55.  See id. at art. 28.2; STEPHEN P. MULLIGAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44761, 
WITHDRAWAL FROM INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: LEGAL FRAMEWORK, THE 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol35/iss2/3
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June 1, 2017 that, “as of today, the United States will cease all 
implementation . . . .”56 Thus, any person with a concrete and 
particularized individual injury that is actual or imminent, that 
is fairly traceable to the cessation of the implementation of the 
Paris Agreement, and that would likely be redressed by a favor-
able decision of the court, should have standing to challenge the 
purported cessation of the implementation of the Paris Agree-
ment.57 Massachusetts, or any coastal state, should have stand-
ing.58 
B. Making Substantive Arguments: The Merits of 
Litigation Challenging President Trump’s Actions 
A central part of the plaintiff’s case would be grounded in 
the principle that compliance with treaty provisions does not 
necessarily assure compliance with the U.S. Constitution.59 This 
is a self-evident principle because, if it were not valid, the Presi-
dent and the Senate acting alone could amend the Constitution 
in violation of its requirements.60 Thus, even if the United 
States complies with the withdrawal procedure in the Paris 
Agreement,61 that fact alone does not mean it has complied with 
the Constitution. Because President Trump took action without 
obtaining any authority from either the House or the Senate, 
 
PARIS AGREEMENT, AND THE IRAN NUCLEAR AGREEMENT 17 (2017), 
https://perma.cc/MGE9-H4MS. 
56.  See Press Release, supra note 1. 
57.  Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 517 (2007) (“To ensure the proper ad-
versarial presentation, Lujan holds that a litigant must demonstrate that 
it has suffered a concrete and particularized injury that is either actual or 
imminent, that the injury is fairly traceable to the defendant, and that it is 
likely that a favorable decision will redress that injury.”) (internal citations 
omitted).  
58.  See id. at 522 (“According to petitioners’ unchallenged affidavits, global sea 
levels rose somewhere between 10 and 20 centimeters over the 20th centu-
ry as a result of global warming. These rising seas have already begun to 
swallow Massachusetts’ coastal land.”) (internal citations omitted). 
59.  See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 505–06 (2008); see also Matthew J. 
Stanford, Odd Man Out, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 929, 975 (2017) (“While some 
treaties automatically bear the weight of ordinary legislation (‘self-
executing’), others require further legislative enactment to become binding 
domestic law.”). 
60.  U.S. CONST. art V, § 2, cl. 2.  
61.  Paris Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 28. 
9
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the question remains: Does the Constitution give the President 
the unilateral power claimed in this case? 
While the abstract question of whether the Constitution re-
quires that either Congress or the Senate have a role in the de-
cision to withdraw from a treaty “has been the source of histori-
cal debate,”62 that question regarding this particular treaty can 
be resolved by an analysis of the UNFCCC. The UNFCCC states 
that each party shall have one vote in discussions and decisions of 
the COP.63 Moreover, the UNFCCC does not change the custom-
ary international law that in treaties, “those who do not agree 
simply do not become bound.”64 Thus, for decisions to be adopted 
by its COP of the UNFCCC, unanimous consent is required. 
Article 7 of the UNFCCC is pivotal to the argument over the 
constitutionality of President Trump’s unilateral order to halt 
implementation of the Paris Agreement. Thus, I first discuss and 
analyze its relevant provisions in preparation for the argument. 
Article 7 of the UNFCCC specifies the responsibilities and 
duties of the COP, thereby creating its authority.65 Of particular 
importance to the argument developed herein is the following 
subsection: 
 
62.  See MULLIGAN, supra note 55, at 6. See also Phillip M. Kannan, Reinstating 
Treaty-Making with Native American Tribes, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 
809, 815 n.36 (2008) (analyzing the conflicting opinions on this topic and 
citing references); David A. Wirth, Executive Agreements Relying on Im-
plied Statutory Authority: A Response to Bodansky and Spiro, 50 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 741, 741 (2017) (“Until recently, the law surrounding execu-
tive agreements has been a subject of attention from a relatively small 
number of academics concerned with foreign relations law, along with 
State Department lawyers who have a need to deploy the underlying con-
cepts in concrete determinations.”); David A. Wirth, The International and 
Domestic Law of Climate Change: A Binding International Agreement 
Without the Senate or Congress?, 39 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 515, 515 (2015) 
(arguing that an international agreement can become binding without ei-
ther Senate advice and consent or new congressional legislation).  
63.  UNFCCC, supra note 7, at art. 18. 
64.  Geoffrey Palmer, New Ways to Make International Environmental Law, 86 
AM. J. INT’L L. 259, 278 (1992) (“Herein lies a fundamental difference be-
tween the legislative and the diplomatic process. With legislation everyone 
is bound by the outcome, including those who do not agree. With treaties 
those who do not agree simply do not become bound.”). 
65.  UNFCCC, supra note 7, at art. 7. 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol35/iss2/3
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The Conference of the Parties . . . may adopt, and shall make, 
within its mandate, the decisions necessary to promote the effec-
tive implementations of the Convention. To this end, it shall . . . 
 (m) Exercise such other functions as are required for the 
achievement of the objectives of the Convention as well as all 
other functions assigned to it under the Convention.66 
By this provision, all parties, including the United Sates, 
have yielded sovereignty to the COP to make decisions that are 
binding on all parties. It is an example of a norm-making arti-
cle—that is, an article in a treaty that specifies how future obliga-
tions for all Parties may be created without going through the 
amendment or ratification procedures specified elsewhere in the 
treaty.67 Sir Geoffrey Palmer called the inclusion of a norm-
making article “prolepsis.”68 He summarized prolepsis as follows: 
Procedures for the creation of norms are agreed upon. Those pro-
cedures  include a provision that in respect of certain rules or in 
certain circumstances unanimous consent is not required. The 
norms created by using the procedures did not necessarily receive 
unanimous consent but are binding on any nation that did not 
consent because they were created by agreed procedures. Nations 
thus consent in advance to be bound by norms whose content is 
unknown at the time of the consent.69 
An example of the successful application of prolepsis can be 
found in the Montreal Protocol. It includes prolepsis to make ad-
justments and reductions (but only these two parameters) appli-
cable to the production or consumption of the ozone-depleting 
substances controlled under the protocol. The following provision 
achieves this: 
The Parties may decide whether . . . adjustments and reductions 
of production or consumption of the controlled substances should 
 
66.  Id. at art. 7.2(m). 
67.  Palmer, supra note 64, at 273. See also Phillip M. Kannan, Mitigating 
Global Climate: Designing a Dynamic Convention to Combat a Dynamic 
Risk, 36 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 491, 514 (2012) (“Once the 
norm-creating procedure is agreed to by states, when it is applied to create 
a norm, all states that consented to the procedure are bound by the norm, 
whether or not they agree with it.”).  
68.  Palmer, supra note 64, at 273. 
69.  Id. (emphasis added). 
11
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be undertaken and, if so, the scope, amount and timing . . . .  In 
taking such decisions, the Parties shall make every effort to 
reach agreement by consensus. If all efforts at consensus have 
been exhausted, and no agreement reached, such decision shall, 
as a last resort, be adopted by a two-thirds majority vote of the 
Parties present and voting [representing a majority of developed 
and developing Parties].70 
The following is an example of how this provision was applied 
in the Montreal Protocol. For developed states and certain ozone-
depleting chemicals, the target production and consumption lev-
els were reduced from 100% of 1986 levels by August 1, 1989 to 
0% of 1986 levels by (and for any time following) January 1, 
2010.71 This dramatic achievement demonstrates the power of 
prolepsis. 
Pursuant to the UNFCCC, the COP unanimously adopted 
the Paris Agreement on January 29, 2016.72 It created prolepsis 
by including the following provision: “[t]o this end, [the COP] 
shall . . . [e]xercise such other functions as are required for the 
achievement of the objective of the Convention as well as all other 
functions assigned to it under the Convention.”73 The Paris 
Agreement’s goals include “enhancing the implementation of the 
[UNFCCC] by . . . aim[ing to hold] the increase in the global av-
erage temperature to well below 2° C.”74 This objective of the Par-
is Agreement is required75 to achieve the objectives of UNFCCC: 
 
70.  Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer arts. 
2(9)(a), (c), Sept. 16, 1987, 1522 U.N.T.S. 3, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-10 
(1987).  
71.  Amendment to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the 
Ozone Layer art. 2A(8), Sept. 21, 2007, 2173 U.N.T.S. 183. 
72.  Paris Agreement, supra note 2. 
73.  UNFCCC, supra note 7, at art. 7.2(m). 
74.  Paris Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 2.1(a) (emphasis added). 
75.  Bob Silberg, Why a Half-Degree Temperature Rise is a Big Deal, NASA 
GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE (June 29, 2016) (“[T]he jump from 1.5 to 2 de-
grees—a third more of an increase—raises the impact by about that same 
fraction, very roughly, on most of the phenomena the study covered. Heat 
waves would last around a third longer, rain storms would be about a third 
more intense, the increase in sea level would be approximately that much 
higher and the percentage of tropical coral reefs at risk of severe degrada-
tion would be roughly that much greater.”), https://perma.cc/7K3Q-ESJM. 
See also Fred Pearce, What Would a Global Warming of 1.5 Degrees In-
crease Be Like?, YALE ENV’T 360 (June 16, 2016), https://perma.cc/CFY3-
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“[t]he ultimate objective of this Convention . . . is to achieve . . . 
stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere 
at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interfer-
ence with the climate system.”76 Thus, when the COP adopted the 
Paris Agreement, it applied its authority to “exercise such other 
functions as are required for the achievement of the objectives of 
the [UNFCCC].”77 Therefore, when the United States became a 
party to the Paris Agreement, it was acting in conformance with 
the U.S. Constitution because the Senate had given its advice and 
consent via prolepsis. 
The above argument based on prolepsis is critical to challeng-
ing President Trump’s actions. If the courts ultimately reject pro-
lepsis and consider the Paris Agreement in isolation, the outcome 
may change. 
The framework for the final argument on the merits devel-
oped in this Essay is the structure articulated by Justice Jackson 
to determine the President’s constitutional powers. He stated: 
“[The President’s constitutional powers] are not fixed, but fluctu-
ate, depending on their disjunction or conjunction with those of 
Congress.”78 He then developed a hierarchical structure with 
three levels of a President’s constitutional powers as follows: 
1. When the President acts pursuant to an express or im-
plied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, 
for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that 
Congress can delegate. In these circumstances, and in these only, 
may he be said (for what it may be worth) to personify the federal 
sovereignty.  
2. When the President acts in absence of either a congres-
sional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own 
independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he 
and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its dis-
tribution is uncertain.  
 
DCNR (discussing the risks of a 2 degree increase in global warming com-
pared to the risks of a 1.5 degree increase). 
76.  UNFCCC, supra note 7, at art. 2.  
77.  Id. at art. 7.2(m). 
78.  Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jack-
son, J., concurring). 
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3. When the President takes measures incompatible with 
the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its low-
est ebb . . . .79 
Justice Jackson’s framework has been called “[the] familiar tri-
partite framework” and adopted in several Supreme Court opin-
ions.80 
The United States became a party to the Paris Agreement 
through the acts of President Obama.81 When he agreed to the 
United States being bound by the Paris Agreement and submit-
ted its initial NDIC, his presidential authority was at its maxi-
mum because these actions were pursuant to an express authori-
zation of the Senate. The express authorization was given when 
the Senate gave its advice and consent to the UNFCCC82—in par-
ticular, to the prolepsis mechanism in Article 7.2(m).83 
When President Trump issued his order for the United States 
to cease implementation of the Paris Agreement,84 his presiden-
tial authority was at its minimum. His actions were incompatible 
with the express or implied will of the Senate—namely, the ad-
vice and consent given by the Senate to the UNFCCC including 
Article 7.2(m), which is the prolepsis provision, and Article 2, 
which states the objectives of the UNFCCC that conflict with 
President Trump’s actions. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The question presented in the title of this Essay can be an-
swered only by resolving the mutually exclusive actions taken by 
two presidents, President Obama and President Trump. In this 
 
79.  Id. at 635–37.   
80.  Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2083 (2015) (“In considering claims of 
Presidential power this Court refers to Justice Jackson’s familiar tripartite 
framework from [his concurrence in] Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. 
Sawyer . . . .”) (internal citations omitted). 
81.  See Paris Agreement – Status of Ratification, U.N. FRAMEWORK 
CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, https://perma.cc/3Y92-9BUB (listing the 
United States as a Party). 
82.  George H. W. Bush, Statement on Signing the Instrument of Ratification 
for the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (Oct. 
13, 1992), collected by THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT, 
https://perma.cc/YXH2-E8TK. 
83.  See supra notes 68–71 and accompanying text.  
84.  See Press Release, supra note 1. 
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Essay, I propose using the framework developed by Justice Jack-
son to resolve these contradictory actions. The action taken by 
President Obama was in conjunction with the Senate; that taken 
by President Trump was in disjunction with both the Senate and 
the House. In exercising his presidential powers, President 
Obama’s authority was “at its maximum.” In exercising his presi-
dential powers, President Trump’s authority was “at its lowest 
ebb.” Given this disparity, it is likely that the answer to the ques-
tion posed in the title of this article is “no.” 
If the answer were “yes,” and if President Trump does not 
serve a second term, a subsequent President could assert the uni-
lateral power relied on by President Trump to reverse his deci-
sion. 
Upholding a President’s unilateral authority to withdraw 
from and stop implementing treaties not submitted to the Senate 
under Article II, § 2, Clause 2 and not based on legislation will 
introduce instability into such treaties to which the United States 
is a party. They will become no more than executive orders of a 
President that can, in effect, be ended by a unilateral decision of 
that President or any later President. The international commu-
nity would not be able to rely on commitments made by the Unit-
ed States in such treaties; such treaties will cease to be an effec-
tive means for achieving international governance. 
President Trump could avoid the points of contention dis-
cussed above and maintain confidence in treaty-making as an ef-
fective means of global governance if he acted in conjunction with 
the Senate by seeking its advice and consent. Otherwise, litiga-
tion challenging his unilateral assertion of authority will surely 
be brought. It is the contention of this Essay that this litigation 
will likely ultimately result85 in a final decision finding President 
Trump’s actions unconstitutional. 
President Trump’s approach to the Paris Agreement is con-
trary to Justice Black’s well-known maxim: “[g]reat nations, like 
 
85.  The argument developed in this Essay is a viable strategy for challenging 
President Trump’s action; it is not a roadmap to a predetermined destina-
tion. See supra p. 305 (“The above argument based on prolepsis given 
above is critical to challenging President Trump’s actions. If the courts ul-
timately reject prolepsis and consider the Paris Agreement in isolation, the 
outcome may change.”)  
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great men, should keep their word.”86 The United States gave its 
word to be bound by the Paris Agreement. A change in admin-
istrations does not create the power in the new President—one 
individual—to unilaterally change the commitments of the United 
States—a sovereign state. In a conflict between the action of a 
sovereign state taken in accordance with its constitution and the 
unilateral action taken by the head of one branch of a later re-
gime violative of a provision in that constitution, the former must 
prevail. 
 
86.  Fed. Power Comm’n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 142 (1960) 
(Black, J. dissenting) (emphasis added). 
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